MILITARY JUSTICE A REINFORCER OF DISCIPLINE by Poydasheff, Robert S.
426 
MILITARY JUSTICE 
A REINFORCER OF DISCIPLINE 
Robert S. Poydasheff 
The American involvement in Viet-
nam generated intense soul-searching, 
questioning, and argument among vari-
ous segments of American society. In 
particular, the My Lai cases and other 
incidents focused public attention upon 
the existing system of military criminal 
law. 1 Many Americans, having little or 
no professional contact with the Armed 
Forces, were exposed to highly mis-
leading and inaccurate generalizations 
and conceptualizations concerning a 
system that "is now a sophisticated 
system of justice.,,2 The military justice 
system must enjoy public confidence 
and understanding, because "a system 
of justice is merely as good as the public 
believes it to be.,,3 There is little, if any, 
value in the system if it is not trusted or 
understood by the American public. 
Unfortunately, some observers 
wrongly perceive the military justice 
system as a system remote from Ameri-
can military ethical considerations, 
having no nexus to justice. They see it 
as one operating to the prejudice of the 
accused by failing to accord him the 
procedural and substantive protections 
of the judicial process under the Consti-
tution and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.4 One writer has 
even erroneously asserted that: "None 
of the travesties of justice perpetuated 
under the UCMJ is really very surprising 
for military law has always been and 
continues to be primarily an instrument 
of discipline, not justice."s 
The Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice does not reflect a congressional 
desire to enforce discipline to the detri-
ment of American notions of justice.6 
Rather, it combines most of the judicial 
concepts relating to individual rights 7 in 
a code of conduct, the violation of 
which is proscribed and which reflects 
the military ethic. While the soldier, by 
joining the military, subjects himself to 
the limitation or curtailment of the 
scope of his basic freedoms (e.g., free-
dom of speech), he surrenders none of 
them. The military member continues 
to enjoy all of the basic rights and 
freedoms he enjoyed in civilian life. 
However, he or she must exercise these 
rights in a manner consistent with the 
overriding interests of the military. 
There was a time when joining the 
military meant the surrender of certain 
righ ts. This is no longer true. In order to 
highlight the role of law in a military 
environment, it is necessary to discuss 
the meaning of the military ethic, cer-
tain codal articles8 as they implement 
the ethic, and some of the basic rights 
of an accused under military law. 
THE MILITARY ETHIC 
The military ethic is not a "theory" 
of military conduct. It is a code of 
behavior pertaining to a profession-the 
profession of arms. This code is con-
sistent with the American tradition. It is 
empirically derived, and by its nature it 
is noncompulsory. Being noncompul-
sory, we should not be surprised that 
not all the members of American Armed 
Forces adhere to it at any given mo-
ment. In order to demand this ad-
herence, the Congress enacted a Uni-
form Code of Military Justice-criminal 
laws-in an attempt to corporealize the 
ethic into concrete statutes, violations 
of which could lead to penal sanctions. 
In so doing, the Congress provided in 
the broadest sense the nexus between 
the military ethic and justice. 
The term "military ethic" is rather 
amorphous when viewed in the abstract. 
Indeed, in attempting to define the term 
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precisely, one generally thinks of "duty, 
honor, country," "loyalty," and "mis-
sion and men." There are many, no 
doubt, who would view the ethical 
conceptions of the American military 
forces as anachronistic. Nevertheless, 
" ... it is in fact the very essence of 
military professionalism.,,9 Today, the 
line between the military services, 
especially the Army, and civilian society 
has become blurred with the mobiliza-
tion of thousands of citizens into uni-
formed citizen-soldiers. As a result, the 
possibilities exist that" ... the patterns 
of military authority [may] shift from 
authoritarian command to organiza-
tional decisionmaking.,,1 0 Under these 
conditions, the concepts embodied in 
the military ethic must be reinforced in 
order to insure adherence to standards 
which are still both viable and necessary 
in the American Armed Forces. 
The Armed Forces constitute a 
unique and specialized society because 
their ultimate function is that of com-
bat in the national defense. For this 
reason, military forces are separate and 
distinct in many aspects from the parent 
civilian society. They have developed 
their own traditions which have given 
rise to the military ethic, which, in tum, 
is based on a recognition that the 
purpose of our military forces is to fight 
wars, or to be ready to fight them, 
should the occasion arise. 1 1 The 
soldier's first duty is the accomplish-
ment of his mission, and his second is to 
insure the welfare of his men. If this 
were not the basic principle, "any mili-
tary operation involving a risk would 
not be undertaken, and in fact the 
military forces could be dispensed 
with.,,12 
The military ethic consists of a code 
of behavior appropriate for an organiza-
tion whose primary purpose is to fight if 
called upon to do so. Its practical effect 
is to provide or to account for the 
motives underlying military conduct. 1 3 
Writers such as Ward Just fail to con-
sider the military ethic as a system of 
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empirical norms which provides the 
guideposts for proper military conduct. 
He has opined that "the army has been 
corporatized. It has become something 
of a syndicate, a corporate state with its 
own laws and traditions and pro-
ceedings." Quite to the contrary, the 
military ethic, by regarding love of 
country, duty, honor, et cetera, as 
virtuous and by emphasizing them con-
tinuously, has enabled the Army to 
avoid succumbing to corporatization. 
For example, the military ethic requires 
the American Army to "maintain a 
nonpartisan posture, i.e., a nonparty 
affiliation. ,,14 Yet we have had obvious 
cases of members of the Army who 
openly and notoriously advocated par-
ticularistic political philosophy. 1 5 An 
extreme example is found in the case of 
Parker v. Levy, 1 6 where Army Captain 
Levy, stationed at Fort Jackson, de-
clared he would not obey a written 
order to conduct training. In addition, 
he made several public statements to 
enlisted personnel indicating that the 
United States was wrong in being in-
volved in the Vietnam war and that 
"Colored soldiers" should disobey 
orders to go to Vietnam. 
Even though the military ethic pro-
scribes formal, public political ad-
vocacy, members of the military profes-
sion may hold political beliefs, show 
political preference, and vote in elec-
tions. One authority goes so far as to 
main tain that "Military personnel 
should be permitted to serve on local 
school boards, run in nonpartisan local 
elections, and be members of govern-
ment advisory boards and public panels 
where they have qualifications and in-
terests.,,1 7 
Thus, the norms of "duty, honor, 
country," "loyalty," and "mission and 
men" provide the parameters as to how 
soldiers ought to behave. 
When viewed from the perspective of 
a lawyer, these norms are seen to 
underlie the concept of discipline, 
which "is the very soul of Armies-
difficult to acquire but capable of being 
lost immediately. There can be no dis-
ruption lest the armed forces disinte-
grate into a mere armed mob amid the 
stresses of peacetime hardship and war 
time fear."IS This approach emphasizes 
that the end or purpose of a soldier's 
action is to obey and not to delib-
erate.19 
MILITARY LAW 
Military criminal law is concerned 
with many concepts that are not neces-
sarily embraced within the character of 
the military ethic. Within the military 
legal framework the independence ·of 
the courts-martial20 from command in-
fluence, the independence of the Court 
of Military Review2 1 and the Court of 
Military Appeals, as well as the tradi-
tional limitation of their scope in 
making new law, are excellent examples 
of the separation of judicial and military 
ethical values in the military law. 2 2 Of 
all the ethical values encompassed in 
military law,· the chief one is the main-
. tenance of a disciplined force, which 
military law in tum reinforces. 
As discipline must be maintained 
within the military, so breaches of 
discipline must be punished. Any breach 
of the military ethic-discipline could 
impair the fighting effectiveness of a 
military unit. Any infraction which 
would lessen a soldier's enthusiasm to 
respond to duty would necessarily 
impair the effectiveness of his unit. 
Should that unit be in combat, any 
reluctance, however slight, to respond 
to duty "could be disastrous, or even 
fatal. ,,23 
Certain aspects of this ethic, em-
bodied in the concept of discipline, are 
peculiar to the Armed Forces. Three 
articles of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice illustrate the importance of law 
in reinforcing the military ethic. The 
first is article 88,24 which prohibits 
commissioned officers from using "con-
temptuous words" against the President, 
Vice President, Congress, and other high 
civil officials. If convicted, an offender 
"shall be punished as the court-martial 
may direct." 
The others are article 92, prohibiting 
disobedience to orders, 2 5 and article 
134,2 6 the so-called general article, 
which punishes, inter alia, "[A] 11 
disorders and neglects to the prejudice 
of good order and discipline in the 
armed forces," not otherwise specifi-
cally mentioned in the UCMJ. 
Article 88-Contemptuous Words. 
During the recently ended Vietnam era, 
a small but vocal group of servicemen 
emerged within the Military Establish-
ment. They expressed in no uncertain 
terms their opposition to the war and 
the role of the United States in it. The 
case of 2d Lt. Henry H. Howe, Jr.,2 7 is 
a classic example of a violation of 
professional ethics which resulted in 
judicial sanctions because the law, in . 
this instance, reinforced the ethic. 
Howe, an Ordnance Corps officer in the 
Army Reserve, was serving on active 
duty at Fort Bliss, Tex. While there, he 
marched with demonstrating civilians in 
downtown El Paso, Tex., condemning 
the Vietnam war. Howe carried a plac-
ard indicating that the late President 
Johnson was a Fascist who was con-
ducting an illegal war. In addition to 
being charged with using contemptuous 
words against President Johnson, Howe 
was charged with conduct unbecoming 
an "officer and gentleman28 and pro-
moting disloyalty and disaffection 
among the troops and civilian populace 
to the prejudice of good order and 
military discipline.29 He appeared 
before a general court-martial, was con-
victed, and sentenced to dismissal,3 0 
forfeiture bf all pay and allowances, and 
confinement at hard labor for 2 years. 
The confinement was reduced to 1 year 
by the convening authority, and the 
sentence was eventually affirmed by the 
United States Court of Military Appeals. 
After serving approximately 3 months 
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of his sentence, Howe was granted a 
parole. 
Should Howe have been tried? Is not 
an American entitled to criticize his 
government as provided for and pro-
tected by the Constitution?31 Howe was 
the first person to have been prosecuted 
under article 88 of the 1950 UCMJ. The 
restrictions of this article embrace not 
only loyalty, one of the fundamentals 
of the military ethic,3 2 but also the 
prenrlse that the American Armed 
Forces are subordinate to duly consti-
tuted civilian authority. After all, under 
the Constitution, the President is Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces, a 
point overlooked by some of Howe's 
defenders. 
Limitation of this proscription to 
officers has been questioned,3 3 and 
during World Wars I and II courts-
martial for such an offense were in-
frequent. In cases where commanders 
did bring servicemen to trial for their 
remarks, courts would acquit if the 
remarks were casual statements made 
"in private conversations and political 
discussions. 1134 Howe's case was far 
different than the cases of servicemen 
expressing contempt in private at the 
apex of duly constituted authority. He 
flagrantly and publicly abused his posi-
tion and in so doing invit~d contentious-
ness among other personnel at Fort 
Bliss. Such "concerted political prose-
lytizing in an attempt to cause general 
disaffection toward the President [was] 
rare. 113 5 Nevertheless, the military ethic 
demands that civil authority be pro-
tected against threats from those who 
are in military power, and if effect is to 
be given to this principle, then there 
must exist a legal proscription, the 
violation of which may be punished. 
No doubt restricting the speech of 
military members invites constitutional 
attack, and article 88 has been criticized 
on this ground.3 6 Even though mem-
bers of the Armed Forces do retain 
certain basic rights,3 7 the military "con-
stitutes a specialized community 
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governed by a separate discipline from 
that of the civilian.,,3 8 If the military 
ethic were to deny this distinction by 
removing the restrictions embraced in 
article 88, it would not only create 
"new forms of tension,,3 9 but might 
start the process of seriously eroding 
respect for and the sanctity of au-
thority. The United States Supreme 
Court appears to reinforce this view. In 
Parker v. Levy, the court said: 
While members of the military 
community enjoy many of the 
same rights and bear many of the 
same burdens as do members of 
the civilian community, within 
the military community, there is 
simply not the same autonomy as 
there is in the larger civilian com-
munity. The military establish-
ment is subject to the control of 
the civilian commander-in-
chief .... 40 
In this case, the majority of the 
Supreme Court limited the constitutional 
right of free speech as it applies to 
servicemen. The Supreme Court is be-
ginning a process of defining constitu-
tional areas which would not be open to 
the military community, because of the 
uniqueness of that community and be-
cause of the importance of preserving the 
superior-subordinate relationship. This 
limitation which was implicitly recog-
nized in Levy particularly applies to 
Howe because more was involved in that 
case. True, the President is the Com-
mander in Chief of the Military Establish-
ment and, as such, he was Howe's su-
perior in the chain of command. Howe's 
conviction could be sustained on that 
issue alone. The major premise underly-
ing article 88 is to reinforce that portion 
of the military ethic which emphatically 
accepts civilian control of the military. 
Thus, if the Howe case had been argued 
before the Supreme Court, it is unlikely 
that the Court would have accepted the 
view that all of the rights and privileges 
guaranteed by the first amendment to all 
persons, especially in the political arena, 
apply in a military context. Indeed, at 
"the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, 
little if any thought was given to whether 
those provisions had direct relevance to 
the military context, and courts-martial 
from the beginning assumed they did 
not. ,,41 Further, some authorities con-
sider the military as an "alien sector" of 
American society which "fall[s] outside 
the area in which ... freedom of expres-
sion must be maintained.,,42 It is 
"alien," of course, because there is a 
separate ethic for the military society. 
To someone who does not appreciate 
the difference between civil and military 
society, there is an inconsistency be-
tween the military ethic (and military 
attitudes) and the civilian values em-
bodied in the first amendment.43 There 
are three ways to view the relationship 
of the military ethic to first amendment 
values: (1) the first amendment right to 
free speech does not apply to the 
military, (2) the protections apply fully, 
without any restrictions,44 and (3) 
there are compatible areas permitting a 
convergence of civilian notions of free 
speech to be applied so long as no 
violation of the military ethic occurs, 
which is serious enou~h to erode disci-
pline.4 5 I subscribe to this latter view. 
The Howe case acutely highlighted this 
relationship. It is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court would conclude that 
first amendment coverage is irrelevant 
to servicemen and that only Congress 
can legislate the scope of constitutional 
application to the military. Congres-
sional power concerning the military is 
not free from judicial scrutiny.46 In our 
society the relationship between the 
military and the rest of society with 
respect to political actions is not 
ambiguous, so long as there is a judi-
cially reinforced ethic guiding the 
actions of military personnel. Of course, 
"the fact that a man is a member of the 
armed forces, and therefore in some 
situations a servant to the state and its 
commanders, does not obliterate the 
fact that as a citizen he has certain 
rights which remain.,,47 But, on bal-
ance, article 88 is an example of the 
military ethic judicially enforced on the 
military segment of society. 48 
Article 92-Failure to Obey Lawful 
Orders. The paramount article of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice which 
highlights and enforces the heart of the 
military ethic is article 92: 
Any person subject to this chapter 
who (1) violates or fails to obey 
any lawful general order or regula-
tion; (2) having knowledge of any 
other lawful order issued by a 
member of the armed forces, 
which it is his duty to obey, fails 
to obey the order; or (3) is 
derelict in the performance of his 
duties; shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct.4 9 
Obedience to orders is the sine qua 
non to discipline; and without discipline 
all aspects of the military ethic fail. To a 
military lawyer, the military ethic and 
its conceptual underpinnings are em-
bodied in the term "discipline." Field 
Marshall Slim has stated the necessity 
for discipline in a military organization: 
The more modem war becomes, 
the more essential appear the 
basic qualities that from the be-
ginnings of history have distin-
guished armies from mobs. The 
first of these is discipline. We very 
soon learned in Burma that strict 
discipline in battle and in bivouac 
was vital, not only for success, but 
for survival. Nothing is easier in 
jungle or dispersed fighting than 
for a man to shirk. If he has no 
stomach for advancing, all he has 
to do is to flop into the under-
growth; in retreat, he can slink 
out of the rear guard, join up 
later, and swear he was the last to 
leave. A patrol leader can take his 
men a mile into the jungle, hide 
there and return with any report 
he fancies. Only discipline ... can 
stop that sort of thing; the real 
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discipline that a man holds to 
because it is a refusal to betray his 
comrades. The discipline that 
makes a sentry, whose whole 
body is tortured for sleep, rest his 
chin on the point of his bayonet 
because he knows, if he nods, he 
risks the lives of the men sleeping 
behind him ... at some stage in 
all wars, armies have let their 
discipline sag, but they have never 
won victory until they made it 
taut again; nor will they. 5 0 
The concept of obedience underlies 
discipline. A failure to obey a lawful 
command could easily jeopardize the 
lives of men, the success of a mission, 
and, if widespread, the organization 
itself. The purpose of article 92 is quite 
clear. Men and women recruited from 
the wide spectrum of American society 
must be taught to obey the orders of 
their superiors. In the heat of combat or 
even in a hostile environment, ordinary 
sanctions and exhortations may be 
neither sufficient nor effective to 
enforce the military value system on the 
members of the organization. It is only 
through long years of training and 
associations with comrades and units 
that service members learn to overcome, 
to varying degrees, their natural in-
stincts of self-preservation. The preser-
vation of all requires the obedience of 
all. For these reasons, the law requires 
that.all members of the military society 
shall obey lawful commands. 
As a general rule, military men and 
women have a legal duty to obey, and 
they may be punished if they do not. 
Article 92 contains an important qualifi-
cation: the order must be lawful. The 
problem is that, when a soldier is 
confronted with an [illegal] order 
to perform an act constituting a 
criminal offense, the demands of 
military discipline, as expressed in 
the duty of obedience to superior 
orders, come into conflict with 
the imperative need to preserve 
the supremacy of the law as 
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manifested in the prescriptions of 
criminal law: military discipline 
requires unflinching compliance 
with orders; the supremacy of the 
law proscribes the commission of 
criminal acts.5 1 
The requirement to obey only lawful 
orders at first seems to present a con-
flict between the values of the military 
ethic and the values of American society 
as reflected in the concept of "Rule of 
Law." In addition to a philosophical 
problem, there is also a practical one: if 
someone obeys an illegal order and thus 
commits a criminal act, he violates other 
provisions of the UCMJ and may be 
tried and punished for them. If, on the 
other hand, he does not obey, he risks 
being punished "for the violation of 
article 92. Further, 
... the horns of the dilemma are 
sharp and strong enough to 
wangle the entire legal system 
insofar as its theory is concerned: 
if a soldier commits an offence in 
obedience to superior orders, and 
is, therefore, criminally indicted, 
or, alternatively, if he refuses to 
comply with an order to perform 
an act constituting an offence and 
is consequently charged before a 
court-martial-will he be con-
victed or acquitted? If he is 
convicted anyhow, whether he 
commits the criminal act as 
ordered or refrains from doing so, 
the legal system seems to be 
tainted by an iniquitous in-
consistency that is all but in-
credible. And if the soldier is to 
incur criminal responsibility for 
his act only in one of the two 
cases and not in the other, certain 
difficulties emerge. On the one 
hand if the soldier risks his life in 
disobeying superior orders and 
refusing to carry out the criminal 
act, whereas he is exculpated 
when the offence is committed by 
him in compliance with the 
orders-this solution may incite 
the commission of crimes and 
bring about a public out-
cry .... 52 
Nowhere was this problem more 
highlighted in American military law 
than in the My Lai cases, which pro-
duced a massive outpouring of hyper-
bole and hurled invectives by an 
aroused public. These cases arose out 
of a particularly deplorable act on 
the part of former 1st Lt. William L. 
Calley and others during operations in 
the subhamIet of My Lai (4) in Song 
My village, Quang Ngai Province, 
Republic of South Vietnam, on 16 
March 1968. The cases concerned 
Calley and some of his troops who 
did the actual shootings and those 
who "covered up" the incident. There 
were many who charged that if the 
perpetrators were not punished (all 
notions of criminal justice appeared 
to vanish) then the soldiers would 
literally be getting away with murder. 
Others asserted that if the soldiers 
were obeying. orders and if they were 
punished, then all other military men 
could defy orders with impunity 
thereby breaking down good order 
and military discipline. 
Not one writer appears to have 
indicated an awareness of American 
military law in this area or that the 
"dilemma" between the law and the 
military ethic had already been recon-
ciled as far as U.S. military forces are 
concerned. It is submitted that the 
My Lai cases, posing the problem 
they did, were properly and correctly 
resolved by the U.S. Army. 
At the time the act was com-
mitted, 1st Lt. William L. Calley com-
manded a platoon in C Company, 1st 
Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Light 
Infantry Brigade, in Vietnam. The 
brigade was a part of the America 
Division which was assigned a tactical 
area of operations along tpe South 
China Sea from Quant Ngai Province 
north into Quang Nan Province. Each 
brigade (there were three) had its 
own operations area; that of the 11th 
Brigade ran from the Duc Pho District 
north to Binh Son and inland approxi-
mately 30 kilometers.s 3 Sometime in 
January 1968, Calley's organization was 
assigned to a composite force known as 
Task Force Barker. This organization 
was assigned an area of operations 
known as Muscatine. 'The units of Task 
Force Barker drew fire from enemy 
forces in the Muscatine area which 
would then withdraw south. After the 
Tet offensive in February 1%8, Task 
Force Barker extended its operations 
southward, enbracing the Son My vil-
lage, because intelligence reports had 
indicated that the 48th Vietcong Bat-
talion had its base in the My Lai area of 
Song My. Sweeps into the area by the 
Task Force were only moderately suc-
cessful. Although Calley's unit had not 
experienced much combat prior to 16 
March 1 %8, it did sustain casualties 
from mines and booby traps. 
On 15 March 1%8, Captain Medina, 
the commander of Calley's company, 
was notified that the company would be 
involved in an offensive action in the 
My Lai area the following day. Medina 
briefed his company that evening about 
the area, the mission, resistance to be 
expected from the 48th VC Battalion, 
and other pertinent matters. Calley 
argued later that Medina ordered him 
and others to "waste them," referring to 
the villagers. 5 4 Nevertheless, the com-
pany engaged in the My Lai operations 
on the 16th of March without receiving 
any fire. No mines or booby traps were 
detonated, and the only unit casualty 
on that day was a self-inflicted wound. 
In the My Lai (4) area only unwarned, 
unresisting, and frightened old men, 
women, and children were encountered 
-no enemy units. Yet, the evidence 
conclusively showed that Calley and 
some members of his platoon, at his 
urging, shot villagers and herded others 
into a ditch on the eastern boundary of 
My Lai (4) and murdered them.s 5 
CalleyS 6 was tried and convicted by 
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a general court-martial held at Fort 
Benning, Ga., of three specifications of 
premeditated murder and one of assault 
with intent to murder in violation of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. He 
was sentenced on 31 March 1971 to 
dismissal, forfeiture of all pay and 
allowances, and confinement at hard 
labor for life. 'The general court-martial 
convening authority, in his review of the 
case, approved the dismissal and the 
forfeitures, but he reduced the confine-
ment portion of the sentence to 20 
years. Calley appealed his conviction on 
grounds alleging numerous irregularities 
occurring at and during the trial. 'The 
issues raised by Calley were resolved 
against him by the Army Court of 
Military Review; that opinion was sus-
tained by the United States Court of 
Military Appeals. 
'The significant point here is that 
among the arguments of extraordinary 
scope employed by Calley's attorneys, 
one factor directly highlighted the 
apparent conflict between the military 
ethic of obedience to orders and the law 
proscribing murder. Assuming arguendo, 
that an order was received by Calley to 
"waste" everybody in My Lai, was he 
justified in heeding such an order? 
Indeed, is there a basic onflict at all 
between civilian notions of legality and 
the obedience to orders? 
'The villagers had a right to life, and 
any order to kill them, so long as they 
were noncombatants and not bellig-
erents, was patently illegal. 'The fact 
that the inhabitants of My Lai sympa-
thized with the Vietcong is not im-
portant so long as they were not at the 
time of the Muscatine operation en-
gaging in hostile actions against Calley's 
platoon. Even if some of the villagers 
had previously engaged in hostile opera-
tions, the wanton killing of the villagers 
in response to the "presumed delicts of 
a few is not a lawful response to the 
delicts. ,,57 Further, reprisal, if indeed 
this was Calley's intent, by "summary 
execution of the helpless is forbidden in 
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the laws of land warfare"s 8 which are a 
part of the laws governing the American 
Armed Forces and have been for numer-
ous years.S 9 Thus, there can be no 
question that any orders to execute 
summarily innocent civilians or those 
eligible for prisoner-of-war status are 
illegal violations of American military 
law. Such orders are not within the 
or bit of article 92.6 0 
The fact that Calley alleged that he 
was ordered to do what he did raises the 
question of whether he could defend his 
action by asserting that, ethically, 
obedience of superior orders was de-
manded of him. Obedience to an un-
lawful order is not a defense in the trial 
of any accused unless he did not know, 
and could not reasonably have been 
expected to know, that the order was 
unlawful. 6 1 Realizing that this issue 
could become one that is difficult to 
resolve, given the dynamics of combat 
and the ethical norm demanding obedi-
ence, the Army specifically permits the 
determination of legality to be made by 
courts-martial. Field Manual 27-10, The 
Law of Land Warfare states: 
b. In considering the question 
whether a superior order consti-
tutes a valid defense, the court 
shall take into consideration the 
fact that obedience to lawful mili-
tary orders is the duty of every 
member of the armed forces; that 
the latter cannot be expected, in 
conditions of war discipline, to 
weigh scrupulously the legal 
merits of the orders received; that 
certain rules of warfare may be 
done in obedience to orders con-
ceived as a measure of reprisal. At 
the same time it must be borne in 
mind that members of the armed 
forces are bound to obey only 
lawful orders.6 2 
In combat situations great difficulty 
can arise in determining the legality of 
an order. Therefore, permitting a court-
martial to consider all of the attendant 
circumstances, to view the accused in a 
light favorable to him, and to demand 
that guilt be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt is a proper and a practical 
way of reconciling the law and the 
ethic.63 
The military ethic is also reconciled 
with civilian notions of justice because 
orders are presumed to be valid, and 
an accused who disobeys an order has 
the burden of proving illegality.64 If a 
soldier believes that the order is 
ambiguous, he is obliged to seek 
clarification from the superior who 
issued the order. If the order is illegal, 
then he "must try to have the order 
rescinded, disregard the order if the 
superior persists, and also report the 
incident to higher headquarters or an 
alternative source.,,6 5 There was no 
evidence anywhere in the Calley case 
that he questioned the presumed order 
of Captain Medina, assuming, as the 
author emphatically does not, that the 
order could be considered valid. Yet, 
Calley should have known that killing 
unarmed, unresisting men, women, and 
children was illegal. Neither the mili-
tary ethic nor the law requires that 
soldiers act as automatons in obeying 
orders. American servicemembers are 
expected to respond to orders as 
persons imbued with our basic societal 
values (taught them in our military and 
civilian schools, the home, and the 
church). The military court took this 
into account in reaching its deter-
mination and found Calley's action as 
an officer woefully wanting. As the 
Court of Military Review stated: 
We find no impediment to the 
fmdings that appellant acted with 
murderous mens rea, including 
premeditation. The aggregate of 
all his contentions against the 
existence of murderous mens rea 
is no more absolving than a bare 
claim that he did not suspect he 
did any wrong act until after the 
operation, and indeed is not con-
vinced of it yet. This is no excuse 
in law.66 
Such a reconciliation of law and 
military ethic will not breed insubordi-
nation, because the servicemember is 
bound only to refuse patently illegal 
orders or those that he personally 
knows are illegal. In cases where legality 
is blurred, "the responsibility rests with 
the superior giving the order, not the 
subordinate who obeys it-he can pre-
sume legality until an obviously illegal 
order arises.,,6 7 Therefore, in such cases 
the defense of superior orders would be 
a legitimate defense for the lower ranks 
who, in obeying illegal orders, could 
contend that they did not know or 
could not have known the orders were 
illegal. They are, as a result, ultimately 
protected by the law. 
Article 134-The General Article. 
The fin~ UCMJ article to be discussed is 
article 134, which is known as the 
"general" or "catchall" article. This 
article is similar in nature to article 133, 
which proscribes conduct that is un-
becoming to officers, obviously an 
attempt to set higher standards for the 
officer corps than for the other ranks. 
Article 134 exists to punish offenses not 
specifically denounced elsewhere in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is a 
primary source for the enforcement of 
the military ethic and, as such, it is a 
unique tool to maintain and strengthen 
discipline. The law embodied in article 
134 does not make "every irregular, 
mischievous, or improper act a Court-
martial offense.,,6 8 Rather, it is limited 
to conduct that is "directly and pal-
pably ... prejudicial to good order and 
discipline.,,69 
Critics have assailed this provision 
and its officer counterpart because, they 
say, there is unpredictability as to what 
actions are punishable. The critics claim 
there appear to be no objective stand-
ards other than a list of specifically 
denounced offenses, and thus the deter-
mination of what offenses are "pre-
judicial to good order and discipline" 
are ultimately within the judgment of 
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an officer imposing punishment or con-
vening a court. This aspect of unpredict-
ability would certainly appear to be true 
in those cases where a breach of a 
custom of the service is charged as an 
offense. The Manual for Courts-Martial 
states that: 
A breach of a custom of the 
service may result in a violation of 
this clause of Article 134. In its 
legal sense of the word "custom" 
imports something more than a 
method of procedure or a mode 
of conduct or behavior which is 
merely of frequent or usual occur-
rence. Custom arises out of long 
established practices which by 
common consent have attained 
the force of law in the mili-
tary .... A custom which has not 
been adopted by existing statute 
or regulation ceases to exist when 
its observance has been long 
abandoned 70 
There appears to be a superficial 
justification for the criticism leveled at 
this codal attempt to enforce tradi-
tionally well-known and accepted stand-
ards. 71 But close analysis indicates that 
civilian standards which require criminal 
statutes to be defmite and certain and 
to provide for predictability have been 
met by the filling-in done by the Court 
of Military Review and the Court of 
Military Appeals as well as the guides 
contained in the appendix to the 
Manual for Courts-Martial. In this 
manner, terms such as "customs" or 
"Conduct of a nature to bring discredit 
on the armed forces" have been con-
tinuously defined and refmed by these 
courts in no less a manner than "funda-
mental rights" and "due process" have 
been defined and given substance by the 
United States Supreme Court.72 
Further, if a member of the military 
service is charged with a particular 
violation of a custom or ethic, his 
actions must also be shown to be 
prejudicial to good order and discipline 
or to bring discredit to his service. In 
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this regard, the military courts and 
commanders are always influenced by 
such factors as time, location, nature of 
offense, and all of the circumstances 
surrounding its commission. 
In two recent cases the constitu-
tionality of these articles was considered 
in the light of contemporary civilian 
standards, and in both cases the courts 
recognized the special nature of the 
military in assessing its needs for laws 
which implement and enforce the mili-
tary ethic. The case of United States v. 
Priest 73 concerned an enlisted man in 
the Navy who, while on active duty, 
edited, published, and distributed an 
underground newspaper. As a result of 
these activities, he was convicted of two 
specifications concerning the publica-
tion and distribution of two issues of his 
publication with intent to promote dis-
loyalty and disaffection among mem-
bers of the Armed Forces. These two 
issues, in their entirety, contained state-
ments disloyal to the United States. The 
Court of Military Appeals found that 
the pamphlets were not only a call to 
action but, in fact, suggested means by 
which the troops might actively demon-
strate their own disloyalty and defec-
tion, for example, by deserting, by 
demonstrating in public, and by refusing 
promotions. The Court found this type 
of activity prejudicial to good order and 
military discipline, stating: 
In the armed forces some restric-
tions exist for reasons that have 
no counterpart in the civilian 
community. Disrespectful and 
contemptuous speech, even 
advocacy of violent change, is 
tolerable in the civilian com-
munity, for it does not directly 
affect the capacity of the Govern-
ment to discharge its responsibili-
ties unless it both is directed to 
inciting imminent lawless action 
and is likely to produce ac-
tion .... In military life, however, 
other considerations must be 
weighed. The armed forces 
depend. on a command structure 
that at times must commit men to 
combat, not only hazarding their 
lives but ultimately involving the 
security of the Nation itself. 
Speech that is protected in the 
civil population may nonetheless 
undermine the effectiveness of 
response to command. If it does, 
it is consti tu tionally un-
protected.74 
Finally, in the landmark case of 
Capt. Howard Levy,75 the United 
States Supreme Court recognized the 
uniqueness of the military society. Levy 
was an Army officer and a physician 
who refused to obey orders to train 
Special Forces. He made public state-
ments urging black enlisted men not to 
go to Vietnam if ordered to do so, and 
he characterized Special Forces per-
sonnel as liars, thieves, killers of peas-
ants, and murderers of women and 
children. Levy was convicted by a 
general court-martial, among other 
things, of conduct unbecoming an of-
ficer and gentleman and for disorders 
and neglects to the prejudice of good 
order and discipline of the Armed 
Forces. He then filed a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus in the Federal District Court 
which denied him relief. However, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the District Court, holding that articles 
133 and 134 were void because of 
vagueness and thereby it applied civilian 
concepts of due process to the military 
sphere. The case was heard by the 
Supreme Court with Justice Rehnquist 
writing the majority view of five mem-
bers. The Court opined that because of 
the differentiations between military 
society and the civilian society, Con-
gress was permitted to legislate with 
greater breadth and flexibility when 
prescribing rules governing the military. 
Further, neither articles 133 nor 134 of 
the UCMJ were void for vagueness 
under the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment since each article has been 
construed by military authorities in a 
manner which narrowed their broad 
scope and because considerable speci-
ficity had been supplied, by way of 
examples, over many years. The Su-
preme Court indicated that Levy could 
have had no reasonable doubt that his 
public statements urging black enlisted 
men not to go to Vietnam if ordered to 
do so were punishable. The Court, in 
effect, recognized that in order to foster 
orderly and dutiful fighting forces, lee-
way must be granted to incorporate 
basic ethical considerations in a criminal 
statute. The Supreme Court stated that: 
II ••• to maintain the discipline essential 
to perform its mission effectively, the 
military has developed what 'may not 
unfitly be called the customary military 
law' or general usage of the military 
service. ,,7 6 
The Supreme Court specifically 
recognized that both the fundamental 
necessity for obedience and the conse-
quent necessity to impose and to main-
tain discipline permits some actions 
which would be constitutionally imper-
missible outside a military organization. 
The Levy case is the best and most 
recent example of the recognition of the 
viability of the military ethic in con-
temporary society and its enforcement 
by the use of judicial sanctions. 
RIGHTS OF MEMBERS 
IN THE ARMED SERVICES 
What has gone before is not to 
suggest in the least that the military 
judicial system is void of judicial con-
siderations in protecting servicemembers 
who have violated the UCMJ. Indeed, 
civilian influence has been extraordinary 
in the area of individual rights con-
cerning military accused. In many cases 
the individual servicemember has en-
joyed greater protection than his civilian 
counterpart. For example, the military 
criminal legal system demands that free 
counsel be provided all accused not only 
during interrogation 77 but also during 
pretrial" stages. 7 8 Further, in one of the 
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most frequently discussed areas of 
criminal law, that of confessions, the 
military legal system, since 1951, has 
provided most of the rights enunciated 
in Miranda v. Arizona,79 a 1966 case 
hailed as a landmark in civil rights. The 
Miranda decision, the leading case re-
garding the privilege against self-
incrimination during custodial interroga-
tion, held that unless a defendant was 
advised of his right to remain silent, that 
any statement made may be used 
against him, and that he has the right to 
be represented by an attorney, the 
prosecutor may not use any of his 
statements, exculpatory or inculpatory, 
during the trial. 
The military legal system has long 
required that persons in the military 
may not interrogate a suspected or 
accused party without first informing 
him of the rights stated in the Miranda 
decision. In addition, "military law al-
ready provided that the suspect or 
accused could consult the legal advisor 
to the court-martial authority, a lawyer 
or his staff, or counsel of his own choice 
before being subjected to interroga-
tion, ,,80 and this right was formally 
recognized and given juridical effect in 
United States v. Tempia,81 a 1967 case 
decided by the Court of Military Ap-
peals. Thereafter, all members of the 
uniformed services were to be afforded 
the protections announced by the 
Supreme Court in Miranda. As the 
Court stated: 
Now, the accused must have a 
lawyer; before, he need not have 
been given one; now, he must be 
warned of his right to counsel; 
before, he need not be so warned; 
and now, finally, he will receive 
effective legal advice not only as 
to what he can do, but also as to 
what he should do. 8 2 
Thus, members of the military have a 
twofold protection: the specific warning 
requirements afforded under article 31 
and the general fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 
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Members of the armed services have 
also been afforded protection from arbi-
trary referral of charges to general 
courts-martial. Congress has provided 
that before a criminal charge may be 
referred" to a trial by a general court, an 
officer must be appointed to investigate 
the charges thoroughly and to recom-
mend formally the disposition of the 
case to the convening authority.83 In 
this article 32 investigation, the investi-
gating officer must impartially and 
judiciously determine whether the evi-
dence warrants criminal disposition. 
This investigation is analogous to a 
grand jury proceeding, but there are 
significant differences, the import of 
which is that the military procedure 
affords greater rights than the grand 
jury. No judge monitors grand jury 
proceedings; furthermore, they are 
generally secret. A prosecutor normally 
guides the grand jury process; and, a 
grand jury may, within its discretion, 
compel the production of evidence or 
the testimony of witnesses, and its 
process generally is unrestrained by the 
technical procedural and evidentiary 
rules which govern criminal trials. Of 
paramount importance is that neither 
the accused nor his counsel are present 
during any of the grand jury pro-
ceedings; they may not cross-examine 
witnesses or submit any evidence with-
out the express approval of the foreman 
of the grand jury. The proceeding is, in 
reality, an ex parte investigation. 
Although the article 32 investigation 
is somewhat similar to a grand jury, 
there are distinguishing features which 
inure to the benefit of a military 
accused. The investigation provides a 
discovery proceeding in which the 
accused may determine the validity of 
the charges before trial.84 In order to 
insure that this is not an empty gesture, 
the military accused is guaranteed the 
right to be present and to be repre-
sented by a qualified attorney during all 
of the hearings. In addition, the accused 
is granted the right to cross·examine all 
witnesses against him if they are avail-
able, to present evidence in his own 
behalf, and to have witnesses testify for 
him. Hence, not only is there compati-
bility with civilian notions of justice and 
fair play, the military system has gone 
far beyond civilian requirements and is 
perhaps paving the way in the moderni-
zation of civilian criminal proceedings. 
Also, civilian standards relating to 
searches and seizures and the right to a 
speedy trial have been part of the 
military criminal law. 
The military justice system has 
traveled a long and sometimes stormy 
and misunderstood path. Yet, as this 
brief summary demonstrates, the 
civilian defendant has no rights greater 
than his military counterpart. Indeed, in 
many areas the protections afforded by 
the code and the Manual for Courts-
Martial exceed those available in civilian 
criminal courts. Here, clearly, the mili-
tary judicial system has kept ahead of 
civilian concepts with no apparent detri-
mental effect upon discipline. The 
opinion of Justice Pouglas in O'Calla-
han v. Parker85 to the effect that 
courts·martial are not independent in-
struments of justice but are a mechan-
ism by which discipline is preserved and 
are marked by "retributive justice,,86 
indicates a woeful lack of understanding 
of military criminal law today.87 Con-
gress has held extensive hearings on the 
subject of law and discipline and has 
consulted with numerous authorities. 
The UCMJ was enacted specifically to 
meet the needs of the Armed Forces 
and to guarantee to individual service-
men and women the profound Ameri-
can values of justice. It worked during 
the Korean and Vietnamese wars. 
CONCLUSION 
The military criminal justice system 
is a reinforcement of the military ethic. 
The Congress, the courts, and the mili-
tary have continually sought to keep the 
UCMJ compatible with the military 
need for discipline and with the basic 
rights of all American citizens guaran-
teed by the Constitution. The Congress 
has done so through amendment, the 
courts' by means of judicial interpreta-
tion, and the military by practice and 
by proposed changes, such as those 
which resulted in the amendments of 
1968. 
What is equally important is that 
military personnel directly concemed-
commanders, lawyers, and criminal in-
vestiqators-have continuously tried to 
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make the system "work." Balancing 
interests has always been a difficult task 
for legislators and courts alike. In the 
area of military justice and discipline, 
balancing of interests is a constant, 
ongoing process. The search for compro-
mise will continue successfully, so long 
as both the civilian and military sectors 
continue to understand that one affects 
the other and that to be effective the 
military ethic and its codal implementa-
tion must be acceptable to American 
society. 
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